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Defense Counsel and Public Defense
Eve Brensike Primus*
Public-defense delivery systems nationwide are grossly 
inadequate. Public defenders are forced to handle caseloads that 
no one could effectively manage. They often have no funding 
for investigation or expert assistance. They aren’t adequately 
trained, and there is little to no oversight of their work. In many 
jurisdictions, the public-defense function is not sufficiently 
independent of the judiciary or the elected branches to allow for 
zealous representation. The result is an assembly line into prison, 
mostly for poor people of color, with little check on the reliability 
or fairness of the process. Innocent people are convicted, precious 
resources are wasted, and the legitimacy of the entire criminal 
justice system is undermined. This chapter suggests that effective 
reform is possible if policymakers address how public-defense 
delivery systems are structured, whether they are independent, 
the sources and amount of funding allocated to public defense, 
and the adequacy of training and oversight mechanisms.
INTRODUCTION
There is broad agreement that indigent-defense delivery systems in 
this country are grossly inadequate. More than 80% of American criminal 
defendants are indigent,1 so the failure to provide for the public-defense 
function compromises the legitimacy of the entire criminal justice system. A 
lack of sufficient funding forces public defenders to handle caseloads that no one 
could effectively manage. Defenders’ abilities to provide quality representation 
are further compromised by a lack of independence from other branches of 
government, an absence of attorney training programs, and a failure at all 
levels to oversee effectively the provision of public-defense services. The result 
is an assembly line into prison, mostly for poor people of color, with little check 
on the reliability or fairness of the process.
1. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 
(Nov. 2000), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/dccc.pdf.
*  Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. I am grateful to Susan Bandes, 
Darryl Brown, David Carroll, Beth Colgan, Jennifer Laurin, Richard Leo, Justin Murray, and 
Jonathan Sacks for helpful comments. In addition, I would like to thank Erik Luna and the staff 
at Arizona State University College of Law for their Herculean efforts in organizing this project 
and the Charles Koch Foundation for funding this endeavor.
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In recent years, many nonprofit organizations have issued reports 
documenting the public-defense crisis.2 Recognizing the importance of the 
problem, two-thirds of the states have created indigent defense commissions 
to think about and implement reform.3 President Obama created the Office 
for Access to Justice4 to provide federal support to the reform efforts, and 
legislatures around the country are thinking about suggested improvements. 
This chapter explores the contours of the public-defense crisis and explains 
why it is an essential area for criminal justice reform, canvasses the scholarship 
on this problem, and identifies possible reforms to fix the system. Ultimately, 
I recommend that policymakers address how public-defense delivery systems 
are structured (as public-defender offices, assigned-counsel systems, or contract 
systems); whether they are independent of the judicial, legislative, and executive 
branches in their jurisdictions; the sources and amounts of funding allocated 
to public defense; and what training and oversight mechanisms exist to ensure 
defense attorneys are effective. Through a combination of reforms in these areas, 
policymakers can begin to fix broken public-defense delivery systems. 
I. THE PUBLIC-DEFENSE CRISIS AND WHY IT MATTERS
In 1963, the Supreme Court held that criminal defendants facing felony 
charges have a Sixth Amendment right to trial counsel regardless of their ability 
to pay for it.5 The Court later extended this right to alleged misdemeanants 
facing actual imprisonment upon conviction.6 It also recognized a constitutional 
2. See, e.g., THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF 
OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL (2009), https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/
default/files/justice_20090511.pdf [hereinafter JUSTICE DENIED]; NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. 
LAW., MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR 
COURTS (2009), https://www.nacdl.org/reports/misdemeanor/ [hereinafter MINOR CRIMES]; 
NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N, A RACE TO THE BOTTOM—SPEED & SAVINGS OVER DUE 
PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS (June 2008), http://www.mynlada.org/michigan/michigan_
report.pdf [hereinafter RACE TO THE BOTTOM]; ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT 




3. THE SPANGENBERG PROJECT, STATE, COUNTY, AND LOCAL EXPENDITURES FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE 
SERVICES FISCAL YEAR 2008, at 5 (2010), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_expenditures_fy08.authcheckdam.
pdf [hereinafter EXPENDITURES].
4. See Office for Access to Justice, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/atj. 
5. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
6. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
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right to counsel for criminal defendants on their first appeals7 and for juveniles 
facing delinquency proceedings that result in a loss of freedom.8
In response to the judicial mandate, Congress passed the Criminal Justice 
Act of 1964,9 requiring federal district courts to adopt local plans for furnishing 
counsel to indigent defendants in federal court. Each plan was to include 
either a Federal Public Defender Organization (a governmental entity in the 
judicial branch) or a Community Defender Organization (a private, nonprofit 
organization) in addition to a court-approved panel of private attorneys 
available to take indigent criminal defense cases. 
Some states and localities have followed suit and created public-defender 
programs. Others rely on assigned-counsel systems under which private attorneys 
are appointed on case-by-case bases and are paid per hour, per case, or per event 
in a case. Still others have contract systems under which private attorneys, law 
firms, or nonprofit entities contract with the state or local government and are 
paid flat fees to provide representation in a percentage of indigent-defense cases. 
Many states use some combination of public-defender offices, assigned-counsel 
programs, and contract systems to provide for indigent defense. 
The right to counsel has always been an unfunded mandate. As criminal 
codes proliferated in the 1970s and ’80s as part of the war on drugs, and 
legislatures earmarked more funding for law enforcement, criminal court 
dockets exploded but without corresponding increases in public-defense 
funding. Numerous investigative reports now document a public-defense 
crisis characterized by funding problems, a lack of independence, and a 
failure of training and oversight. These structural problems create a culture of 
indifference in criminal courts, leading to the wrongful conviction of innocent 
people10 and undermining the legitimacy of the criminal justice system.
A. FUNDING PROBLEMS
The vast majority of American criminal defendants are indigent, and 
funding for public defense is grossly insufficient for providing adequate legal 
representation to such a large client base. A few numbers should make the 
point. According to the American Bar Association (ABA), no defender should 
7. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
8. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
9. Criminal Justice Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-455, 78 Stat. 552 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3006A).
10. See Brandon L. Garrett, “Actual Innocence and Wrongful Convictions,” in the present Volume.
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handle more than 400 misdemeanor cases in a year.11 In Chicago and Atlanta, 
however, public defenders have had to handle more than 2,000 misdemeanor 
cases annually.12 In New Orleans, funding shortages have forced public defenders 
to handle almost 19,000 misdemeanor cases per year.13 Similarly, the ABA 
recommends that no defender handle more than 150 felony cases each year,14 but 
public defenders in Florida’s Miami-Dade County have had to handle more than 
700.15 Countless reports document excessive defender caseloads arising from the 
lack of funding.16 The sheer volume of cases means that many defendants sit in 
jail for months before speaking to their court-appointed lawyers.17 
In addition to lacking the funds to pay an adequate number of attorneys, 
public-defender offices lack the funds necessary to provide the attorneys they do 
have with training, mentorship, or supervision. Lacking training and support, 
and asked to handle far more cases than is feasible, defenders commonly feel 
overwhelmed. They often burn out and quit after only a year or two on the 
job, leaving much indigent-defense representation to a rotating crop of new, 
inexperienced attorneys.
A lack of funding also means insufficient resources for adequate investigative 
assistance. In 2013, six states reported that they had fewer than 10 total 
investigators on staff for all of the state’s public-defender offices.18 Many cases 
are resolved with no investigation whatsoever. 
11. ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, TEN PRINCIPLES OF A 
PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM 5 n.19 (2002) [hereinafter TEN PRINCIPLES]. The American Bar 
Association has sent mixed signals about whether it recommends that no attorney handle more 
than 300 or 400 misdemeanor cases in a year. Compare id. (400 cases), with ABA STANDARDS FOR 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES 72, 72 n.13 (3d ed. 1992) (300 cases). Under either 
number, current defender caseloads far exceed the recommendation.
12. See MINOR CRIMES, supra note 2, at 21.
13. Id.
14. TEN PRINCIPLES, supra note 10.
15. See KAREN HOUPPERT, CHASING GIDEON: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR POOR PEOPLE’S JUSTICE 91–94 (2013).
16. See, e.g., MINOR CRIMES, supra note 2, at 21 (reporting excessive caseloads in Texas, Arizona, 
Tennessee, Utah, and Kentucky); JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 2, at 65–70; RACE TO THE BOTTOM, 
supra note 2, at 27; BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 2, at 16.
17. See Eric Holder, U.S. Att’y Gen., Remarks at the Brennan Legacy Awards Dinner, Brennan 
Center for Justice (Nov. 17, 2009) (discussing these delays).
18. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE-ADMINISTERED INDIGENT DEFENSE 
SYSTEMS, 2013 (Nov. 2016), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/saids13.pdf [hereinafter STATE-
ADMINISTERED SYSTEMS].
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This lack of funding is striking when compared to the funding for the 
prosecution and law enforcement. Prosecutors often have higher salaries than 
defenders,19 lighter caseloads, and more access to investigative and expert 
assistance.20 Prosecutors have the police department and state crime labs to 
help with their investigations, whereas defense attorneys often have neither 
investigative nor expert assistance readily available. 
The source of public-defense funding is also troubling. A 2010 report found 
that only 23 states completely fund their indigent-defense systems at the state 
level.21 In 19 states, counties shoulder the burden for more than half of the 
funding. Pennsylvania requires its counties to provide all of the funding for 
indigent defense. A lack of state funding means that financial resources cannot 
be spread across the state. Urban counties with large indigent populations are 
overwhelmed and have resorted to conscripting unwilling and inexperienced 
attorneys who have no criminal-defense background and no financial incentive 
to be zealous advocates to represent indigent criminal defendants. Other urban 
counties resort to flat-fee contract systems to save money, resulting in defense 
lawyers who carry large caseloads for little compensation. These contract 
lawyers often have to supplement their incomes with other work, resulting in 
less time for their indigent-defense clients. 
Many less-populous rural counties rely on assigned-counsel systems 
under which attorneys are paid as little as $40 per hour with hard caps on 
how much an attorney can earn per case.22 With caps as low as $500 per 
felony case,23 these attorneys have no financial incentive to go to trial, do legal 
research, or investigate. They are better off pleading out a case, getting the 
fee, and getting a new client.
19. Some jurisdictions with large public defender offices have achieved salary parity through 
legislation or local practice, but disparities persist in many jurisdictions. See, e.g., Ronald F. 
Wright, Parity of Resources for Defense Counsel and the Reach of Public Choice Theory, 90 IOWA L. 
REV. 219 (2004).
20. See David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729 (1993).
21. See EXPENDITURES, supra note 3, at 5.
22. See THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, RATES OF COMPENSATION PAID TO COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL IN 
NON-CAPITAL FELONY CASES AT TRIAL: A STATE-BY-STATE OVERVIEW (2007), http://www.americanbar.
org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_2007felony_
comp_rates_update_nonfelony.authcheckdam.pdf.
23. Id. at 9–16.
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Even in counties that can afford public-defender offices, the reliance on county 
funds often means that the income stream for the office is not stable. In New 
Orleans, for example, the public-defense budget relies on traffic-ticket revenue.24 
If the police do not issue enough tickets, there is no money for indigent defense.
B. LACK OF INDEPENDENCE
Many indigent-defense attorneys cannot provide effective representation, 
because they are not sufficiently independent of the judiciary. A statewide 
survey of Nebraska judges revealed that some judges punish court-appointed 
attorneys who take cases to trial rather than pleading them out by not 
reappointing those attorneys in future cases.25 In Texas, there are reports of 
judges appointing those with whom they have personal relationships.26 And 
in Detroit, Michigan, some claim that judges give cases to attorneys who make 
contributions to their re-election campaigns.27
Independence problems also exist when elected legislative or executive officials 
have too much control over public-defender offices. A recent report documented 
nine states in which the governor had the power to fire the chief public defender,28 
and claims persist that governors have used their removal power to fire especially 
zealous defenders.29 In Onondaga County, New York, the Legal Aid Society lost a 
contract to handle city court cases after the director was questioned by a legislative 
committee about why she was filing motions and making discovery requests instead 
of pleading cases.30 And in some jurisdictions, the public defender is chosen by an 
advisory board that consists entirely of law enforcement personnel and prosecutors 
who have a vested interest in ensuring that prosecutions are successful.31 
24. See State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780 (La. 1993); see also David Carroll, Indigent Defense 
Progress Stunted by Outdated Funding Mechanism in Louisiana, SIXTH AMENDMENT CENTER 
(Sept. 26, 2012), http://sixthamendment.org/indigent-defense-progress-stunted-by-out-dated-
funding-mechanism-in-louisiana/. For a more general description of the problems associated 
with using fines and fees to fund the criminal justice system, see Beth A. Colgan, “Fines, Fees, and 
Forfeitures,” in Volume 4 of the present Report.
25. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 2, at 82–83; Holder Remarks, supra note 17.
26. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 2, at 82–83.
27. RACE TO THE BOTTOM, supra note 2, at 27.
28. STATE-ADMINISTERED SYSTEMS, supra note 18.
29. See Eve Brensike Primus, Culture as a Structural Problem in Indigent Defense, 100 MINN. L. 
REV. 1769, 1790 & n.116 (2016) (collecting examples).
30. See JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 2, at 81.
31. See, e.g., Manny Araujo, New Public Defender Set to Start Amid Questions About Hiring 
Process, EUREKA TIME-STANDARD (Feb. 18, 2017), http://www.times-standard.com/article/
NJ/20170218/NEWS/170219800. 
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Such independence problems are built in to the federal defender system, because 
the Criminal Justice Act vests control over the structure of appointment and 
funding for indigent defense in the local courts.32 This means local judges decide 
which attorneys can be panel attorneys and whether to approve their payment 
vouchers or expense requests. Similarly, circuit courts hire the heads of the federal 
defender organizations and determine how many attorneys can work in the offices. 
Moreover, the judiciary is charged with asking Congress for funding for both the 
courts and the defense function at the same time. A 2015 report documented 
judicial concern that the Executive and Budget Committees sought to reduce the 
defender budget in order to protect and grow the judiciary’s own budget.33
C. FAILURE TO TRAIN AND OVERSEE
Too often, defenders are thrown into the job without training, and their 
performance is never evaluated. Many offices do not have training directors 
or funds for training programs. Attorneys learn in court, and defenders often 
get no constructive feedback from, or substantive review by, supervisors. In 
assigned-counsel and contract systems, there is often no supervisor at all—just 
a bureaucrat who coordinates appointments. And the local bar associations do 
a terrible job of finding and removing ineffective attorneys.34
Courts have done little to address these problems. Citing separation-of-
powers principles, judges have been loath to inject themselves into state funding 
issues. Moreover, given the prevailing constitutional standard for judging the 
adequacy of trial representation, the very fact that defenders are persistently 
underfunded and overwhelmed prevents courts from ruling that any particular 
failure of representation is a constitutional violation for which a court could 
order a remedy. Under Strickland v. Washington,35 there is no constitutional 
violation of the right to effective counsel unless the defendant shows that (a) 
his attorney performed unreasonably given prevailing norms of practice (with 
a heavy measure of deference to the trial attorney’s strategic decisions and a 
presumption that decisions were strategic) and (b) the attorney’s deficient 
performance prejudiced the case outcome. When prevailing norms of practice 
require attorneys to carry excessive caseloads and meet clients for the first time 
on the trial date, it is hard to show deficient performance. And when there is 
little to no pretrial investigation, it is hard to demonstrate prejudice.
32. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A.
33. See NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAW., FEDERAL INDIGENT DEFENSE 2015: THE INDEPENDENCE 
IMPERATIVE 24 (2015).
34. See, e.g., Carol Steiker, Gideon at Fifty: A Problem of Political Will, 122 YALE L.J. 2694, 2705 
(2013) (arguing that bar associations could do more).
35. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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Given the difficulty of getting courts to rule that the representation in any 
given trial was inadequate under Strickland, some public defenders and advocacy 
groups have filed pretrial lawsuits arguing that funding and independence 
problems in particular jurisdictions violate the Sixth Amendment, because they 
constructively deny indigent defendants counsel altogether.36 These lawsuits 
present courts not just with individual cases of abysmal representation, but 
with data demonstrating the gross inadequacy of public-defense delivery 
systems as a whole. Nonetheless, many courts have been reticent to get involved. 
Some courts have dismissed the cases on procedural grounds;37 other cases 
have settled.38 And even in the few places where courts have found systemic 
constitutional violations,39 the process has been extremely time- and resource-
intensive, and the long-term impact of favorable decisions remains unclear.40
D. A BROKEN SYSTEM WITH SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES
The lack of funding, excessive caseloads, minimal training, lack of 
independence, and failure of oversight make it impossible for defense attorneys 
to do their jobs. The result is a breakdown in the adversarial system that 
results in wrongful convictions and undermines the legitimacy and fairness 
of the system. In too many jurisdictions, criminal-defense attorneys show up 
on the day of court having never met their clients and having conducted no 
investigation or legal research into their cases. After a hurried five-minute 
conversation, the client is pushed into a plea and forced down the assembly 
36. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) (noting that, if “the surrounding 
circumstances made it so unlikely that any lawyer could provide effective assistance,” it would 
be appropriate to presume ineffectiveness); see also Lorelei Laird, Starved of Money for Too Long, 
Public Defender Offices are Suing—and Starting to Win, A.B.A. JOURNAL (Jan. 1, 2017) (describing 
lawsuits); Cara H. Drinan, The Third Generation of Indigent Defense Litigation, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. 
& SOC. CHANGE 427 (2009) (same); Stephen F. Hanlon, State Constitutional Challenges to Indigent 
Defense Systems, 75 MO. L. REV. 751 (2010) (same).
37. See, e.g., Luckey v. Miller, 976 F.2d 673, 676–79 (11th Cir. 1992); Duncan v. State, 784 
N.W.2d 51 (Mich. 2010); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Lessons from Gideon, 122 YALE L.J. 2676, 
2687-88 (2013) (collecting cases and discussing procedural barriers).
38. See, e.g., Hurrell-Harring v. State of New York, 930 N.E.2d 217 (N.Y. 2010) (settlement 
order available at http://www.nyclu.org/files/releases/10.21.14_hurrellharring_settlement.PDF).
39. See, e.g., Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1122 (W.D. Wash. 2013).
40. Even after the New York settlement in Hurrell-Harring, for example, the state had trouble 
implementing legislative reforms. See Press Release, ACLU, Governor Rejects Bipartisan Reform 
of Public Defense System (Jan. 3, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/news/governor-rejects-bipartisan-
reform-public-defense-system; see also Cara H. Drinan, Getting Real About Gideon: The Next 
Fifty Years of Enforcing the Right to Counsel, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1309, 1331 (2013) (noting that 
systemic litigation is time-consuming and expensive). But see Press Release, NYCLU, Lawmakers 
Pass Major Statewide Reforms of Public Defense System (April 10, 2107), https://www.nyclu.org/
en/news/lawmakers-pass-major-statewide-reforms-public-defense-system. 
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line to prison.41 Many indigent criminal defendants do not even get that five-
minute conversation with an attorney; their constitutional rights to counsel are 
simply ignored, and they are forced to navigate the justice system without any 
help whatsoever.42 No one listens to the defendant’s side of the story, questions 
the adequacy of the prosecution’s proof, or even explains to the defendant what 
is happening. All that the defendant’s family and friends see is another poor 
person of color being processed through the system.43 Sometimes defendants’ 
pleas are taken en masse as group after group of men in orange jumpsuits are 
corralled into the courtroom and carted off to prison.44 
This failure to provide defendants with adequate representation contributes 
to the wrongful imprisonment of innocent people. Scientific advances like DNA 
testing have made the public more aware that wrongful convictions happen.45 
Defense lawyers are supposed to fight to prevent the conviction of innocent 
people, but crushing caseloads and a lack of time and funding to investigate 
cases inhibits their ability to perform that vital role. The chief district defender 
for Orleans Parish in Louisiana recently acknowledged that his office is not 
able to guarantee “the timely retrieval of … important evidence before it [is] 
routinely erased” and, as a result, innocent people can be imprisoned.46
The fact that our system does not care about or listen to the people it 
imprisons is problematic not just for the innocent. It also undermines the 
legitimacy of the system in the eyes of the public. As a matter of procedural 
justice, when people do not feel that they have been treated fairly, it is hard for 
them to respect the system’s results.47 That lack of respect, in turn, encourages 
lawlessness and undermines the goals of the criminal justice system. Indigent 
41. See, e.g., Pub. Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit v. State, 115 So. 3d 261, 278 (Fla. 2013) 
(“Witnesses from the Public Defender’s Office described ‘meet and greet pleas’ as being routine 
procedure.”); see also BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 2, at 16 (describing this practice in other 
jurisdictions). For a more detailed description of the plea bargaining system and its problems, 
see Jenia I. Turner, “Plea Bargaining,” in the present Volume.
42. See RACE TO THE BOTTOM, supra note 2, at 15–16 (describing denials of counsel and 
explaining that local practitioners often refers to arraignment days in court as “McJustice Day” 
for this reason).
43. See Paul Butler, “Race and Adjudication,” in the present Volume.
44. See United States v. Roblero-Solis, 588 F.3d 692, 693–94 (9th Cir. 2009) (describing this 
practice). I have personally witnessed this group-plea process in Genesee County, Michigan. See 
Primus, supra note 29, at 1777.
45. See generally BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS 
GO WRONG (2011); see also Garrett, supra note 10.
46. Derwyn Bunton, When the Public Defender Says “I Can’t Help,” N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/19/opinion/when-the-public-defender-says-i-cant-help.
html?_r=0. 
47. See generally TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006).
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criminal defendants routinely complain that their trial attorneys assume that 
they are guilty, don’t listen to them, and don’t communicate with them.48 
That is a problem in any system that wants to be perceived as legitimate, but 
it is particularly problematic in an adversarial system that relies on zealous 
defenders to justify its results.
The failure to provide defendants with adequate trial representation also 
creates inefficiencies in the system and generates larger costs later in the process. 
Society pays to imprison people who would have been released had they had 
competent counsel to argue for them.49 And money is wasted at the appellate 
and post-conviction stages relitigating cases that would not be in the system if 
they had been properly litigated at trial.50 
II. RESEARCH ON THE PUBLIC-DEFENSE CRISIS
Researchers have addressed the funding, independence, training, oversight, 
and cultural problems discussed above. There is also research that more 
generally considers how to improve the reliability and quality of defense 
representation assuming a financially strained environment.
A. FUNDING 
Many have argued for more public-defense funding at the national level as 
well as at state and local levels.51 Some suggest that funding should be tied to 
data-supported workload standards.52 Others want to compare defense and 
prosecutorial funding.53 For example, prosecutors and defenders could create 
weighted caseload studies about their needs and ask the legislature to commit 
to funding the same percentage for each side or to develop a formula that would 
48. See Primus, supra note 29, at 1776. 
49. See Megan Stevenson & Sandra G. Mayson, “Pretrial Detention and Bail,” in the present 
Volume (noting that the lack of counsel at bail review hearings leads to larger rates of pretrial 
incarceration).
50. See Nancy J. King & Joseph L. Hoffmann, Rethinking the Federal Role in State Criminal 
Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 791 (2009) (arguing that money spent in federal habeas review might 
be better spent upfront on better trial representation); see also Eve Brensike Primus, Structural 
Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 
679 (2007) (noting that money is wasted when appellate counsel are not able to raise ineffective-
assistance-of-trial-counsel claims); Nancy J. King, “Criminal Appeals,” in the present Volume 
(describing waste at the appellate level).
51. See, e.g., BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 2, at 41; Chemerinsky, supra note 37 (discussing the 
need for funding); Stephen B. Bright & Sia M. Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and Resistance After 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 122 YALE L.J. 2150, 2173–74 (2013)
52. Missouri and Texas have conducted these studies and others are underway in Colorado, 
Louisiana, Rhode Island, and Tennessee.
53. See Wright, supra note 19.
Reforming Criminal Justice130
require defender funding to be at least a specified percentage of prosecution and 
law enforcement funding.54 
Many have argued that it would be more cost-effective to provide most 
public-defense services through public-defender offices rather than assigned-
counsel or contract systems.55 It is more efficient to pay for and run one office 
than to fund many individual practitioners who are working separately but 
doing the same thing. Defenders working together can pool resources from 
office space and computer resources to support services and intellectual 
capital.56 They can divide their work more efficiently, systematically train and 
supervise entering attorneys more readily, and share information in ways that 
promote efficiency and improve the quality of their representation. Studies in 
Texas document that public-defender offices would cost 23% to 31% less per 
misdemeanor and 8% to 22% less per felony than assigned-counsel systems, 
resulting in annual statewide savings of $13.7 million.57 Similar studies in New 
54. See id. at 238–41 (noting how Tennessee has a ratio that allocates 75 cents to public defense 
for every dollar given to the prosecution and how Connecticut funding targets for public defense 
are set at 2/3 the level for the prosecution); David E. Patton, The Structure of Federal Public 
Defense: A Call for Independence, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 335 (2017) (arguing that public defense 
funding should be linked to a percentage of law enforcement and prosecutorial funding).
55. See Primus, supra note 29, at 1806-07; MICHIGAN INDIGENT DEFENSE COMMISSION, 
DELIVERY SYSTEM REFORM MODELS: PLANNING IMPROVEMENTS IN PUBLIC DEFENSE (Dec. 2016), http://
michiganidc.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Delivery-System-Reform-Models-Final-
Dec-2016.pdf (explaining why public defender offices promote higher quality representation, 
are more cost-effective, and provide institutional resources to the system); TEXAS TASK FORCE ON 
INDIGENT DEFENSE & THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, BLUEPRINT FOR CREATING A PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICES IN 
TEXAS (June 2008), http://www.tidc.texas.gov/media/36005/2008blueprintfinal.pdf [hereinafter 
BLUEPRINT] (same); see also Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Searching for Solutions to the Indigent Defense 
Crisis in the Broader Criminal Justice Reform Agenda, 122 YALE L.J. 2316, 2328 (2013) (“Those 
who are receptive to the smart-on-crime approach eventually will recognize that the better 
equipped our indigent defense system is, the less waste and inefficiency our criminal justice 
system will produce.”).
56. See ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, NATIONAL INDIGENT DEFENSE 
REFORM: THE SOLUTION IS MULTIFACETED 21–22 (2012), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/publications/books/ls_sclaid_def_national_indigent_defense_reform.authcheckdam.pdf 
[hereinafter SOLUTION].
57. See TEXAS TASK FORCE ON INDIGENT DEFENSE, EVIDENCE FOR THE FEASIBILITY OF PUBLIC DEFENDER 
OFFICES IN TEXAS (2011), http://www.tidc.texas.gov/media/31124/pd-feasibility_final.pdf. 
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York and Iowa project cost savings of between $125 and $200 per case.58 Other 
studies conclude that public-defender offices often deliver lower conviction 
rates and shorter sentences than assigned-counsel systems, which would result 
in reduced probation and prison costs down the line.59
Some scholars have suggested that tradeoffs within the criminal justice 
system can and should be made to make more funding available. For example, 
Professors Nancy King and Joseph Hoffmann have argued that Congress should 
drastically cut federal habeas corpus review and divert the money saved to 
public defense.60 More recently, some scholars have argued for reducing public-
defense costs by permitting non-lawyers to represent criminal defendants in 
limited circumstances.61 Professor Stephanos Bibas has gone further, suggesting 
that we (a) shrink the constitutional right to counsel so it applies only to felonies 
that result in imprisonment or (b) modify criminal justice procedural rules to 
58. According to a 2014 study in upstate New York, public defenders spent an average of 
$255.28 per weighted case whereas assigned counsel spent an average of $382.59 per weighted 
case. See NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF INDIGENT LEGAL SERVICES, ESTIMATE OF THE COST OF COMPLIANCE 
WITH MAXIMUM NATIONAL CASELOAD LIMITS IN UPSTATE NEW YORK—2014 UPDATE (Nov. 2015), https://
www.ils.ny.gov/files/Estimate%20of%20the%20Cost%20of%20Compliance%20with%20
Maximum%20National%20Caseload%20Limits%20in%20Upstate%20New%20York%20-%20
2014%20Update%20-%20FINAL.pdf. Given that assigned counsel handled 239,525 weighted 
cases in 2014, see id.; the state could have saved $30,493,927.75 had those cases been handled by 
public defender offices. A 2007 report from Iowa documented a cost per case for public defenders 
at $227 as compared to $427 for court-appointed private attorneys. See OFFICE OF THE IOWA STATE 
PUBLIC DEFENDER, STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER’S EFFICIENCY REPORT 2 (Dec. 7, 2007), https://www.legis.
iowa.gov/docs/publications/DF/7519.pdf.
59. See James M. Anderson & Paul Heaton, How Much Difference Does the Lawyer Make?: The 
Effect of Defense Counsel on Murder Case Outcomes, 122 YALE L.J. 154 (2012) (noting that public 
defenders reduce their clients’ murder conviction rate by 19% and lower the probability that 
their clients will receive a life sentence by 62% and that public defenders reduce overall expected 
time served in prison by 24% when compared to assigned counsel); RADHA IYENGAR, AN ANALYSIS 
OF THE PERFORMANCE OF FEDERAL INDIGENT DEFENSE COUNSEL (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res. Working 
Paper No. 13187, 2007), https://www.ils.ny.gov/files/Iyengar%202007.pdf (“Defendants with 
CJA panel attorneys are on average more likely to be found guilty and on average receive longer 
sentences. Overall, the expected sentence for defendants with CJA panel attorneys is nearly 8 
months longer.”).
60. See King & Hoffmann, supra note 50. I am not persuaded that streamlining federal habeas 
corpus review in the ways that Professors King and Hoffmann propose will result in significant 
cost savings, and, given the injustice that currently plagues public-defense delivery in the states, I 
am reticent to impose additional limits on access to the federal courts. See Eve Brensike Primus, 
A Crisis in Federal Habeas Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 887 (2012).
61. See Donald A. Dripps, Up from Gideon, 45 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 113, 127 (2012); Drinan, 
supra note 40, at 1335–44; Benjamin H. Barton & Stephanos Bibas, Triaging Appointed-Counsel 
Funding and Pro Se Access to Justice, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 967, 994 (2012). I am skeptical of this 
proposal for the reasons discussion in Part III, infra.
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eliminate many rules of evidence and adopt more of an inquisitorial system 
that would not need lawyers.62 Finally, a number of experts argue that the 
costs of public-defense delivery can be reduced by decriminalizing nonviolent 
offenses, diverting certain offenses to pretrial service programs, or reclassifying 
offenses as civil infractions.63
In my own work, I have argued that policymakers need to improve the 
sources as well as the amounts of public-defense funding.64 Placing the fiscal and 
organizational responsibilities for indigent defense at the county level creates 
an impoverished, dependent, and unstable defender culture. It is accordingly 
essential that public defense be funded on a statewide basis.
B. INDEPENDENCE
Although many experts have argued that a lack of funding contributes to 
the public-defense crisis, it is not just about money. A number of scholars 
have also recognized that the public-defense function must be sufficiently 
independent of the judiciary, chief executive, and legislature so that defenders 
can provide zealous representation without fear of repercussions.65 Whether 
the indigent-defense commission or public-defender office should be run by an 
independent public-interest board of trustees or housed under the executive or 
legislative branches remains contested,66 but scholars agree that judges should 
not oversee the hiring, payment, and assignment of cases to the attorneys who 
appear before them. They also agree that public-defense delivery systems must 
be sufficiently insulated from the legislative and executive branches that they 
can provide zealous advocacy without fear of losing jobs or funding.
C. TRAINING AND OVERSIGHT
Scholars urging more training for entry-level defenders have pointed to 
defender programs like the Public Defender Service in Washington, D.C., as 
providing a model.67 These experts contend that initial training should be 
62. See Stephanos Bibas, Shrinking Gideon and Expanding Alternatives to Lawyers, 70 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 1287 (2013).
63. See, e.g., SOLUTION, supra note 56, at 9, 14–17; Fairfax, supra note 55, at 2329–32; Alexandra 
Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055 (2015); Alexandra Natapoff, 
“Misdemeanors,” in Volume 1 of the present Report.
64. See Primus, supra note 29, at 1783–89.
65. See, e.g., Primus, supra note 29, at 1789–91; Patton, supra note 54.
66. See Patton, supra note 54.
67. See, e.g., Primus, supra note 29, at 1813–15; Steiker, supra note 34, at 2707; Charles J. 
Ogletree, Jr., An Essay on the New Public Defender for the 21st Century, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
81, 90–92 (1995); SOLUTION, supra note 56, at 11. 
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followed by a period of supervision with access to mentors.68 Indigent-defense 
administrators should develop metrics designed to measure the performance 
of their line attorneys and should, at regular intervals, evaluate their progress.69 
Some contend that local bar associations and indigent-defense commissions 
can play important oversight roles both in preparing and publishing standards 
that represent best practices and in coordinating and superintending the 
oversight of appointed counsel and public-defender systems.70
The judiciary also has an important oversight role to play, so long as its 
oversight functions do not compromise defender independence by directly 
involving judges in the hiring, case assignment, and payment of attorneys. For 
example, scholars have proposed that courts should review the adequacy of 
public-defense delivery systems and the defenders’ abilities to provide zealous 
representation. Some scholars want trial judges to be sensitive to caseload 
pressures and resource constraints and more willing to take creative pretrial 
steps to address these issues. For example, Professor Donald Dripps has argued 
that courts, during initial plea colloquies, should inquire in open court and 
make affirmative findings that defense counsel has provided effective assistance 
before being willing to enter a guilty plea.71 He also contends that trial courts 
should inquire before a trial whether the defense is institutionally equipped to 
litigate as effectively as the prosecution.72 Professor Carol Steiker encourages 
trial judges to refer inadequate attorneys for bar discipline.73
Others contend that courts should be more willing to entertain legal 
challenges to indigent-defense delivery systems and use their supervisory 
powers to impose caseload limits or catalyze legislative reforms.74 Courts in 
Missouri and Florida have taken bold steps forward by empowering public 
defenders to withdraw from or prevent future appointments in cases once 
their caseloads reach a certain level.75 In many states, the mere threat that the 
68. See THE CAPITAL AREA PRIVATE DEFENDER SERVICE, ANNUAL REPORT 2015 (2015), https://assets.
adobe.com/link/d1b1b70a-4a44-474e-64b3-247893a13829?section=activity_public&page=1 
[hereinafter CAPITAL AREA REPORT] (describing a mentoring program that exists in Texas).
69. See, e.g., Primus, supra note 29, at 1816; SOLUTION, supra note 56, at 25–26. 
70. See, e.g., Primus, supra note 29, at 1818; Drinan, supra note 40, at 1315–19 (discussing the 
importance of creating professional standards); SOLUTION, supra note 56, at 18–24.
71. See Donald A. Dripps, Why Gideon Failed: Politics and Feedback Loops in the Reform of 
Criminal Justice, 70 WASH & LEE L. REV. 883, 918 (2013).
72. See Donald A. Dripps, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: The Case for an Ex Ante Parity 
Standard, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 242, 243 (1997).
73. See Steiker, supra note 34, at 2705.
74. See, e.g., Primus, supra note 29, at 1819.
75. See Pub. Defender, Eleventh Judicial Circuit v. State, 115 So. 3d 261, 279 (Fla. 2013); State 
ex rel. Mo. Pub. Defender Comm’n v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592 (Mo. 2012) (en banc).
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judiciary is going to get involved has been sufficient to prompt legislative action. 
In Massachusetts, for example, the Supreme Judicial Court once threatened 
that it was going to order the release of all defendants detained pretrial unless 
attorneys were appointed for them within a specific time period. In response, 
the Massachusetts Legislature increased the defender office’s funding.76 Cases 
in Georgia, Washington, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, and Louisiana have all 
catalyzed similar reforms.77
Finally, scholars have argued that the federal government could do more 
to protect the right to counsel. Some have suggested that a greater share of 
the federal funding currently provided to support state and local criminal 
justice projects should be earmarked for indigent defense or that such funding 
should be conditioned on state compliance with minimal standards for the 
provision of public defense.78 Others want Congress to pass legislation creating 
a National Criminal Justice Commission—an oversight body designed to 
review state and federal criminal justice systems and make recommendations 
for improvement.79 Professor Cara Drinan has argued for a National Right to 
Counsel Act that would create a private right of action for individuals to sue 
in federal court alleging right-to-counsel violations.80 I have suggested that 







76. See Steiker, supra note 34, at 2703 (discussing the Massachusetts example).
77. See VIDHYA K. REDDY, INDIGENT DEFENSE REFORM: THE ROLE OF SYSTEMIC LITIGATION IN 
OPERATIONALIZING THE GIDEON RIGHT TO COUNSEL 17–36 (Wash. U. Sch. of Law Working Paper 
No. 1279185, 2008), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1279185 (discussing 
cases).
78. Steiker, supra note 34, at 2709.
79. See, e.g., Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., From “Overcriminalization” to “Smart on Crime”: American 
Criminal Justice Reform—Legacy and Prospects, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 597, 612–13 (2011).
80. See Cara H. Drinan, The National Right to Counsel Act: A Congressional Solution to the 
Nation’s Indigent Defense Crisis, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 487 (2010). Although I support such an act 
in theory, it could face constitutional challenges in federal court. Abstention doctrine requires 
the federal courts to refrain from interfering with ongoing state court criminal proceedings. See 
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). It remains unclear whether abstention is constitutionally 
required or merely prudential. Thus, it is unclear whether Congress can legislate around it. As 
a result, I have counseled against relying solely on a private cause of action to get federal courts 
to address these problems. See EVE BRENSIKE PRIMUS, AM. CONST. SOC’Y FOR L. & POL’Y, LITIGATION 
STRATEGIES FOR DEALING WITH THE INDIGENT DEFENSE CRISIS (2010). 
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deputized interest groups the power to file enforcement actions against any 
state that engages in a pattern or practice of conduct that deprives criminal 
defendants of the right to effective counsel.81
D. RELIABILITY AND QUALITY OF PUBLIC DEFENSE
One simple way to improve the reliability and quality of public-defense 
representation is to allow defense lawyers to give cases the time that they require 
rather than mass-processing them. For private attorneys, that means banning 
flat-fee contracts (as Nevada recently has done), that incentivize the speedy 
disposition of cases over quality representation.82 It also means paying private 
attorneys a reasonable hourly wage for taking indigent-defense cases. For 
public defenders, it means putting caps on caseloads, like those that now exist 
in Washington and Massachusetts.83 Not surprisingly, empirical research shows 
that attorneys can spend more time with their clients, investigate cases more 
thoroughly, and provide better representation when their caseloads are capped.84
One county in Texas is currently experimenting with a client-choice model of 
defender assignment to improve defender culture. Originally proposed by Professors 
Stephen Schulhofer and David Friedman,85 this model permits defendants to select 
the attorneys who will represent them at state expense. The idea is that attorneys who 
communicate effectively with their clients and do well for their clients will be sought 
after, while those who do not will lose business and be driven out of the market.
I have argued that state-funded, statewide public-defender offices improve the 
quality of indigent-defense representation and are better than assigned-counsel 
or contract systems.86 Their group structure tends to promote more training and 
81. See PRIMUS, LITIGATION STRATEGIES, supra note 80. I also proposed federal legislation that 
would create a post-trial habeas action that would permit litigants to bring systemic violations 
of the right to counsel to light and permit federal courts to address them without running into 
abstention doctrine concerns. See id.; see also Eve Brensike Primus, A Structural Vision of Habeas 
Corpus, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2010).
82. See, e.g., Primus, supra note 29, at 1811; SOLUTION, supra note 56, at 30.
83. See MINOR CRIMES, supra note 2, at 24; Primus, supra note 29, at 1809–10.
84. See, e.g., MELISSA LABRIOLA ET AL., INDIGENT DEFENSE REFORMS IN BROOKLYN, NEW YORK: AN 
ANALYSIS OF MANDATORY CASE CAPS AND ATTORNEY WORKLOAD (2015), http://www.courtinnovation.
org/sites/default/files/documents/Case_Caps%20_NYC_0.pdf.
85. See Stephen J. Schulhofer & David D. Friedman, Rethinking Indigent Defense: Promoting 
Effective Representation Through Consumer Sovereignty and Freedom of Choice for All Criminal 
Defendants, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73 (1993); see also Stephen J. Schulhofer, Client Choice for 
Indigent Criminal Defendants: Theory and Implementation, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 505 (2015) 
(describing the Texas experiment).
86. See Primus, supra note 29, at 1806-09; see also MICHIGAN INDIGENT DEFENSE COMMISSION, 
supra note 55 (explaining why public defender offices promote higher quality representation, are 
more cost-effective, and provide institutional resources to the system); BLUEPRINT, supra note 55.
Reforming Criminal Justice136
oversight, better communication and informal mentoring, and more pooled 
resources that save attorneys time and allow them to do their jobs better.
III. IMPLEMENTING REFORM
States interested in reforming their public-defense delivery systems 
should consider creating a statewide task force charged with collecting data 
about the scope of the problem and making recommendations about how 
best to structure public-defense delivery in the state. The task force can be 
created by the governor (as in Michigan),87 the legislature (as in Idaho),88 or 
the judiciary (as in Utah).89 A diverse group of criminal justice stakeholders 
and policymakers (including a number of defense attorneys from different 
areas of the state) should be members of the task force, and they should 
engage national technical assistance to help them assess their current delivery 
systems and learn about best practices nationwide.90 Ultimately, the task force 
can recommend judicial, legislative, and executive interventions to improve 
the system. To be effective, however, these reforms must be multifaceted, 
addressing the funding, lack of independence, failure of training and oversight, 
and quality problems discussed above.
A. STRUCTURE
Reformers in a given jurisdiction should first examine how public-defense 
delivery systems are structured. Is there a public-defender office, an assigned-
counsel system, a contract system, or some combination? Research shows that 
statewide public-defender offices are more efficient and cost-effective and 
also improve the quality and reliability of indigent-defense services.91 They 
can more easily provide training, mentorship, and supervision for entry-
level attorneys. And their group structure allows them to effectively deploy 
investigative, expert, and staff support.
87. See David Carroll, Michigan Passes Public Defense Reform Legislation, SIXTH AMENDMENT 
CENTER (June 19, 2013), http://sixthamendment.org/michigan-passes-public-defense-reform-
legislation/. 
88. See David Carroll, Idaho Empowers State Commission with New Authority and New 
Funding, SIXTH AMENDMENT CENTER (March 23, 2016), http://sixthamendment.org/idaho-
empowers-state-commission-with-new-authorities-and-new-funding/. 
89. See David Carroll, Utah Reforms Indigent Defense with First-Ever State Dollars for Trial 
Representation, SIXTH AMENDMENT CENTER (March 16, 2016), http://sixthamendment.org/utah-
reforms-indigent-defense-with-first-ever-state-dollars-for-trial-representation/. 
90. For example, the National Legal Aid and Defender Association provided technical reports 
to aid reforms in Michigan and Idaho while the Sixth Amendment Center issued a report on 
Utah’s practices.
91. See supra note 55 (collecting sources).
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Despite this research, only 22 states have statewide public-defender offices.92 
Some states have not been willing to invest the initial capital that would be 
required to create a statewide office (even though it would be more cost-
effective over time). Others have refused to adopt statewide offices because of 
political pressure from attorneys who benefit from the quick, easy fees they can 
obtain in assigned-counsel or contract systems. Still others have legislators who 
are reticent to reform public-defense delivery systems in ways that appear soft 
on crime for fear of losing re-election.
Policymakers should think creatively about how to move more states toward 
statewide public-defender offices or, at the very least, toward public-defense 
delivery systems that are structured to mimic the benefits of statewide public-
defender offices. If there is entrenched political opposition to a statewide 
public-defender office because attorneys fear a loss of revenue, the state might 
start with a statewide office that handles only a small percentage of the public-
defense caseload93 and gradually increase the caseload over time. Even a relatively 
small statewide office can organize training programs for attorneys throughout 
the state, collect and disseminate defender resources, and improve the quality 
of representation.94 Alternatively, the state could create a statewide indigent-
defense commission responsible for working with each county to ensure 
that the counties provide effective defense representation. That commission 
could, in turn, work with counties or regions to create local public-defender 
offices, and the commission could function much as the central administration 
of a statewide agency would by creating standards, implementing training 
programs, and overseeing the provision of services throughout the state.95
Even with public-defender offices, states will need other indigent-defense 
delivery systems to provide representation in cases where conflicts of interest 
prevent one office from representing all defendants and to ensure that the 
92. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER PROGRAMS, 2007 
(Sept. 2010), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/spdp07.pdf. 
93. The Public Defender Service in Washington, D.C., for example, is not permitted to handle 
more than 60% of the indigent defense caseload. See D.C. CODE § 2-1602.
94. States can also opt to create statewide public defender offices for certain stages of the 
process. For example, a dozen states have statewide appellate public defender offices even though 
they do not have statewide services at the trial level. See Robert L. Spangenberg & Marea L. 
Beeman, Indigent Defense Systems in the United States, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 31, 45 (Winter 
1995); see also King, supra note 50. 
95. States that are unwilling to create public defender offices should find ways to create 
similar group structures to take advantage of economies of scale and provide support, training, 
and oversight to criminal defense attorneys in the state.
Reforming Criminal Justice138
private bar remains actively involved in defense representation.96 Flat-fee 
contract systems should be banned, because they perversely encourage 
attorneys to process cases quickly rather than representing their clients 
well. Instead, states should adopt managed assigned-counsel systems.97 In a 
managed assigned-counsel system, experienced administrators hire, train, 
supervise, and coordinate the assignment of cases to private attorneys. A 
good managed assigned-counsel system will create a cohesive, experienced, 
and knowledgeable private criminal-defense bar that ensures quality 
representation and takes advantage of economies of scale by sharing resources 
and intellectual capital. It will work closely with any local public-defender 
office, sharing training information and other resources, to ensure quality 
representation throughout the system.
Although it is too early to reach definitive conclusions about the client-
choice model based on Texas’s ongoing experiment, I see considerable reasons 
for skepticism. The client-choice model assumes that defendants will have the 
requisite information to make good choices for themselves. Perhaps career 
criminals who learn the system well will know who the good attorneys are, but 
it seems unlikely that most arrestees will know whom to choose. Advertising 
may be more important than skill. Good-looking white men might be 
chosen over less attractive women or minorities based merely on stereotypes. 
Moreover, client choice could create an aura of competition among defenders 
that is destructive to defender culture—for example, if attorneys refuse to share 
resources or advice with one another for fear of helping the competition. When 
the Texas experiment is fully evaluated, one important question to ask will be 
how the client-choice model affected defender culture and the quality of the 
resulting representation.
All indigent-defense delivery systems—whether public-defender offices, 
indigent-defense commissions, or managed assigned-counsel systems—need 
to be structured to be independent of other branches of government. Public-
defender offices, indigent-defense commissions, and managed assigned-
counsel systems should be run by independent commissions or boards of 
trustees. No elected official should have the power to hire and fire the head of 
the agency. And these boards should not be comprised solely of prosecutors 
96. Some states have adopted separate public defender offices specifically to handle conflict 
cases. This has the advantage of maintaining the benefits of the group structure discussed above, 
but it does not encourage the private bar to remain engaged in defense representation.
97. For an example of a managed assigned-counsel system, see THE CAPITAL AREA PRIVATE 
DEFENDER SERVICE, ANNUAL REPORT 2015 (2015), available at https://assets.adobe.com/link/
d1b1b70a-4a44-474e-64b3-247893a13829?section=activity_public&page=1 (describing the 
managed-assigned-counsel system in Travis County, Texas). 
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and law enforcement officials, but rather should be staffed by a diverse group 
of individuals, many of whom have criminal defense experience. The public-
defense function also needs to be independent of the judiciary. Courts should 
not make appointments; approve experts, investigators, and payment vouchers; 
or evaluate the performance of individual attorneys, except in the context of 
legal challenges to the adequacy of an attorney’s representation. Rather, the 
public defender’s office, indigent-defense commission, or administrators in the 
managed assigned-counsel system should make those judgments. In the federal 
system, the Criminal Justice Act needs to be amended to create an independent 
body to oversee the appointment and payment of federal defenders.98
B. FUNDING
More money must be spent on public defense. Funding should be 
grounded in data-supported workload studies that include consideration 
of the funding earmarked for the prosecutorial function (including law 
enforcement). Several firms now perform data-driven workload studies 
in cooperation with state indigent-defense commissions, public-defender 
offices, or bar associations.99 Policymakers should consider commissioning 
workload analyses to determine how much of a funding problem exists in 
particular jurisdictions and then use the results to argue for caseload caps 
and for additional funds as necessary for public defense. 
If a legislature cannot fully fund the public-defense function, it should 
take into account how its proposed budget compares to the prosecution’s 
budget. Prosecutors and defenders should be equally compensated, and 
the prosecutorial and defender budgets should be proportionate to the 
caseloads each office handles. When private attorneys are employed through 
an assigned-counsel system, they should be paid reasonable hourly fees to 
handle indigent-defense cases.
98. See Patton, supra note 54 (proposing amendments).
99. For example, the American Bar Association, in association with the consulting firm 
RubinBrown and the Missouri State Public Defender System, recently conducted a study (using 
survey techniques and empirical analytical methods) to quantify how much time a public 
defender should reasonably spend on different types of cases to provide effective assistance of 
counsel. See RUBINBROWN LLP, THE MISSOURI PROJECT: A STUDY OF THE MISSOURI PUBLIC DEFENDER 
SYSTEM AND ATTORNEY WORKLOAD STANDARDS WITH A NATIONAL BLUEPRINT (June 2014), http://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/2014/ls_sclaid_5c_
the_missouri_project_report.authcheckdam.pdf. The Missouri public defender used the study 
to lobby for more funding and the legislature responded. See Laird, supra note 36 (describing 
how the legislature relied on the data and attempted to allocate more funding).
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State legislatures should provide for statewide funding of indigent defense 
even if the delivery systems are chosen at the county level. That would at least 
ensure some financial stability and more independence from the influence of 
local politics. Legislatures should also identify stable and dedicated funding 
streams for public defense rather than relying on traffic fines, court fees, or 
other assessments that are highly erratic and often fall heavily on the poorest 
citizens. This would minimize the need to ask future legislatures to raise public-
defense funding, which is important given the political challenges of asking 
elected officials to do anything that might appear to be soft on crime.
Finally, policymakers should consider ways to reduce criminal justice 
system costs overall. By fully decriminalizing certain nonviolent offenses or 
reclassifying them as civil infractions, lawmakers could alleviate caseload 
burdens for defenders while also achieving larger benefits for society.100 I 
am more skeptical of suggestions to reduce costs by shrinking the right to 
counsel and having laypeople argue in court on behalf of criminal defendants. 
Laypeople might be productively used as initial intake interviewers, subpoena 
servers, public-records collectors, or liaisons to a client’s family member. In fact, 
many public-defender offices already use law clerks, interns, and investigators 
who are not lawyers to perform many of these functions. But an attorney is 
needed in court to navigate the complexities of the substantive and procedural 
laws when a person’s liberty is at stake.
C. TRAINING AND OVERSIGHT
Entry-level public defenders need to be adequately trained before they begin 
representing people in court, and each new defender should have a period of 
supervision with an experienced mentor once on the job. After that supervision 
period ends, every defender should be evaluated by supervisors in the defender 
office according to established and recognized metrics and be given feedback 
about how to improve. The Atlanta-based organization Gideon’s Promise 
provides a model for rigorous, entry-level defender training combined with 
supervision and mentoring over a three-year period.101 Each state should have a 
state-funded indigent-defense training director (housed in the administration 
of the public-defender office, indigent-defense commission, or managed 
assigned-counsel system) whose job is to ensure that entry-level defenders get 
quality training and mentorship. Quality training should include more than 
100. See Natapoff, supra note 63.
101. See Primus, supra note 29, at 1814 (describing the program); Steiker, supra note 34, at 
2710–11. More information about Gideon’s Promise training and mentorship programs is 
available at http://www.gideonspromise.org/.
Defense Counsel and Public Defense 141
trial advocacy classes or information about the mechanics of the court system. 
It should also teach entry-level attorneys how to relate to and communicate 
with clients and how to deal with the challenges of the job.102 Each state should 
also create objective metrics for assessing defender performance. Evaluation 
should include observing the attorney in court, reviewing trial transcripts and 
pleadings involving that attorney, looking at case outcomes, and speaking to 
the clients and court personnel who have worked with the attorney.
Here too, judges can play an important role without compromising the 
independence that defenders need. I agree with those who have argued that 
trial judges should make ex ante inquiries into whether defenders have been 
able to meet with their clients, investigate their cases, and provide effective 
representation. Judges should also be more amenable to using their supervisory 
authority to impose caseload limits, entertain motions to withdraw from 
overwhelmed public defenders, refer ineffective attorneys to the local bar 
association for disciplinary action, and encourage legislatures to address 
funding and independence problems. 
At the federal level, Congress should create a federal oversight body designed to 
review state and federal criminal justice systems and make recommendations for 
improvement. A federal body could communicate with the many indigent-defense 
commissions and nonprofit organizations that are currently working on this crisis 
to collect, analyze, and distribute information and prevent duplication of work. 
Congress should also give the Department of Justice federal enforcement authority 
to bring actions against states that systematically violate the right to counsel and 
permit the Department to extend its own reach in this area by deputizing private 
individuals or interest groups to file enforcement actions in its name.103 
RECOMMENDATIONS
There is no one silver bullet that will solve the public-defense crisis. Rather, 
policymakers must adopt reforms that address the structure of public-defense 
delivery, ensure that the defense function is independent of the other branches 
of government, alleviate the excessive caseloads that defenders currently have, 
increase and restructure public-defense funding, and ensure that mechanisms 
are in place to train attorneys and oversee the defense function.
102 See Primus, supra note 29, at 1814 (describing model training programs).
103. Even without new legislation, the federal government can continue to earmark federal 
grants for states that are collecting data and trying to fix broken public defense delivery systems. 
Alternatively, the Justice Department could continue its recent practice of filing amicus briefs in 
support of plaintiffs challenging indigent defense delivery systems in court. Such interventions 
have been critically important in encouraging states to settle these cases and make improvements 
in their delivery systems.
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1. Statewide task force. Policymakers should begin by creating a statewide 
task force consisting of a diverse group of criminal justice stakeholders 
and policymakers (including a number of defense attorneys from different 
parts of the state) to collect data, analyze the current public-defense delivery 
systems in the state, and make recommendations for improvements. The 
task force should engage national technical assistance to help it assess the 
current delivery systems and learn about best practices nationwide.
2. Structure. Policymakers should strive to create state-funded, statewide 
public-defender offices to handle most cases. Those statewide offices 
should be supplemented by state-funded, managed assigned-counsel 
systems to handle conflict-of-interest cases and continue the involvement 
of the private bar in indigent-defense representation. Flat-fee contract 
programs for attorney assignment should be banned. If in a given state 
there is not enough political support to create a state-funded, statewide 
public-defender office, policymakers should strive to create a state-funded, 
statewide indigent-defense commission that can then work with localities 
to create county-based or regional public-defender offices and managed 
assigned-counsel systems. If a state chooses to proceed with an indigent-
defense commission, it should ensure that the commission has sufficient 
power vis-à-vis the counties to ensure that counties do not choose public-
defense delivery systems that are inefficient or encourage poor advocacy.
3. Independence. Policymakers should ensure that each of a state’s chosen 
public-defense delivery systems—whether public-defender offices, 
managed assigned-counsel systems, or indigent-defense commissions—
are sufficiently independent of the judiciary, legislature, and executive 
branch that defenders need not fear retaliation for vigorous advocacy. 
Judges should never be responsible for assigning cases, approving costs, 
or monitoring individual attorney performance. Instead, administrators 
in the public-defender office, managed assigned-counsel system, or 
indigent-defense commission should be responsible for attorney 
assignment, cost and fee approval, and individual oversight. Those 
administrators should be appointed by a board that is independent of 
the political branches of government.
4. Excessive caseloads. Policymakers should consider imposing caseload caps 
based on data-driven case-weighting studies that indicate how many cases 
attorneys in a given jurisdiction can effectively handle. In jurisdictions 
where this is not possible, defense attorneys should, consistent with 
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American Bar Association guidelines,104 notify the courts of their inability 
to accept additional cases if doing so will compromise their ability to 
provide effective representation. If they cannot provide competent 
representation, they should move to withdraw from appointments, and 
courts should be receptive to such requests. Bar associations should be 
more willing to advocate for judicial and legislative enforcement of ethics 
rules that prohibit excessive caseloads.
5. Funding. Policymakers should ensure statewide funding for public 
defense instead of relying on individual counties to pay the costs. The 
amount of funding should be tied to data-driven case-weighting studies 
that indicate how much public-defense funding is necessary to provide 
effective representation, and it should take into account how much 
funding is earmarked for the prosecution and law enforcement. Moreover, 
public-defense funding should have a stable and dedicated source so 
that defenders—rarely a popular constituency in budgeting processes—
do not need to continually renegotiate the source and amount of their 
funding. Prosecutors and public defenders should have pay parity, and 
assigned counsel should be paid a reasonable wage. Policymakers should 
also consider reducing the cost of the public-defense function by fully 
decriminalizing some nonviolent offenses.
6. Training and oversight. Each public-defense delivery system should 
have a training director responsible for developing and implementing 
a mandatory training program for entry-level attorneys. Entry-level 
training should be complemented by a mentorship program that links 
entry-level defenders to senior defense attorneys. All defense attorneys 
should be regularly evaluated according to established metrics and 
should receive feedback on how to improve.
Judges should be willing to (a) make ex ante inquiries into the effectiveness 
of defense counsel; (b) impose caseload caps; (c) grant motions to withdraw 
when caseloads are excessive; (d) refer ineffective attorneys to the local bar 
for discipline; and (e) be receptive to systemic challenges to public-defense 
 
 
104. See ABA COMM. ON ETHICS & PROF. RESP., FORMAL OPINION 06-441 (2006), http://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_
def_ethics_opinion_defender_caseloads_06_441.authcheckdam.pdf; ABA STANDING COMM. 




delivery systems. Local bar associations should take a more active role as well, 
supporting public-defense reform efforts and being more willing to discipline 
ineffective attorneys.
The federal government should continue to encourage states to adopt best 
practices for public-defense delivery through its funding choices and by 
filing amicus briefs in lawsuits challenging broken public-defense delivery 
systems. It should also pass proposed legislation that would (a) create 
a federal oversight body to collect, analyze, and distribute information 
about best practices and (b) give the Department of Justice authority to 
file federal enforcement actions (or deputize others to do so) when states 
systematically violate indigent defendants’ rights to counsel.
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